Asian Security

Tomoaki Nakano

Will the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Become an Illusion?

Shinzo Abe’s 2016 proposal for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) articulated a vision in which shared maritime freedom underpinned regional stability and global prosperity. As Asian economies have become central to the global economic system, their dependence on maritime trade has only deepened, rendering open sea lanes indispensable for continued growth. However, after Abe’s assassination in 2022, developments in the Indo-Pacific have moved sharply away from his vision.

China’s coercive activities in the South China Sea—ranging from deploying coastguard and maritime militia vessels to intimidating neighboring states like the Philippines—have destabilized the region. Its increasingly routine military exercises around Taiwan and demonstrated capacity to impose blockades further highlight its intent to normalize military pressure and challenge the regional balance of power. Simultaneously, Russia’s deepening alignment with North Korea amid the war in Ukraine, supporting missile development and naval capabilities such as submarines, poses an additional threat to East Asian security and contributes to a broader erosion of the maritime order.

Collectively, these actions by authoritarian states endanger the foundational principle of free and open seas, upon which the economic future of Asia—and by extension, the United States—depends. U.S. prosperity in the coming decades is forecast to be closely tied to economic interaction with Asia, making the defense of FOIP a shared strategic imperative rather than a purely regional concern.

In response, Japan and the U.S. must revitalize Abe’s strategic vision through enhanced security cooperation, particularly in maritime and inter-service domains. This entails pooling technical and operational expertise, integrating emerging technologies such as space assets and AI into joint operational concepts, and sustaining credible combat readiness. Regular and visible deployment of such capabilities across the Indo-Pacific will communicate clear deterrence: that attempts to alter the status quo by force will be met with coordinated resistance. Only through persistent, force-backed engagement at sea can the international community preserve the Indo-Pacific as a truly free and open maritime domain.

Micah Murphy

Beyond the Hull: Three Maritime Priorities for the Alliance

Asian security is often described as increasingly “complex,” but that observation has been true for years. What is different now is the pace of change—and whether U.S., Japanese, and Allied responses can match China’s rapid buildup. The Chinese Communist Party’s maritime ambitions are well-documented, and their modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) through an aggressive shipbuilding strategy has already shifted the regional balance. Meanwhile, Japan’s renewed debate over constitutional reform and the United States’ deepening alliances through the Quad and AUKUS reflect a shared commitment to regional stability—but speed and coordination will determine success.

From a maritime perspective, three priorities stand out:

First, shared shipbuilding programs. Interoperable, modern fleets create more than just military strength; they ensure that allies can sustain operations over distance and enjoy economies of scale in procurement and maintenance.

Second, robust military and commercial sealift. Logistics are the backbone of readiness. Modern sealift capacity—ships that move forces, equipment, and supplies—ensures crisis response is timely and effective while supporting deterrence in peacetime.

Third, regular but unpredictable joint and combined exercises. Consistency builds trust and readiness among allies, but strategic unpredictability prevents adversaries from anticipating or exploiting patterns.
Taken together, these efforts would strengthen deterrence, maintain freedom of navigation, and reinforce the credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Other regional actors, from Australia and India to ASEAN partners, play critical roles by adding resilience to this network and signaling that security in the Indo-Pacific is a shared responsibility, not a bilateral contest.

This is not about confrontation, but preparation. By investing in compatible fleets, logistics capacity, and flexible training, the United States, Japan, and their partners can credibly demonstrate that the Indo-Pacific will remain open, stable, and secure for all who depend on it.

Tom Le

Demography is Destiny: The Graying of Asian Security

The most effective security plans are calibrated to meet specific threats but, more importantly, are mindful of the resources available to address them. In East Asia, there is growing anxiety over North Korea’s nuclear program, a rising and revisionist China, and the norm-breaking consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war. These challenges are not new, reflecting the fragile peace the region has enjoyed over the past few decades. Yet, the factor that will more profoundly shape how the United States, Japan, and like-minded countries manage these threats is demographics. Aging and declining populations will reshape national interests, introduce domestic economic instability, constrain state capacity, and open new avenues of cooperation.

Under the Trump administration, the United States has pressured allies to assume greater responsibility for regional threats, primarily by increasing defense spending, purchasing American weapons, and deepening military integration. On the latter, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been strengthened through Japan’s new National Security Strategy, Defense Buildup Program, and the establishment of a joint force headquarters. However, Washington’s expectations for Japan to sustain or expand its defense capabilities should be tempered by demographic and economic constraints—a fate the United States itself will soon confront.

In 2024, Japan recorded its sixteenth consecutive year of population decline, shrinking by more than 900,000 due to a fertility rate of only 1.15 births per woman. This demographic decline has created a sense of existential crisis and tangible social strain, from closing schools to tightening labor markets. As the world’s first hyper-aged society, with over 21 percent of its citizens aged 65 or older, Japan faces mounting fiscal pressure as social welfare costs rise. For defense planners, a smaller, older population means fewer recruits, fewer taxpayers, and limited capacity to sustain military modernization.

Ultimately, the future of Asian security will be shaped as much by domestic demographic factors as by external threats. The United States and Japan must calibrate their alliance to harness shared strengths while mitigating the inescapable consequences of population decline.

Margaret K. Lewis

Go, Learn, Do: A Tribute to Jerome A. Cohen

In his memoirs published last year, the storied lawyer and scholar Jerome A. Cohen stressed, “How to preserve freedom for the 24 million people on Taiwan without becoming involved in military conflict with the PRC appears to be the foremost of the immediate foreign policy challenges confronting the United States.”

Jerry, as he preferred to be called, will not see whether the United States successfully rises to that challenge, having died in November at the age of 95. But we can still learn from his example when navigating tensions in the Taiwan Strait: go, learn, and do.

The Taiwan Strait is dominantly viewed through a lens of U.S.-China relations. To be sure, Xi Jinping and Donald Trump have tremendous power over the region’s future. While they met on the sidelines of the APEC summit in South Korea and are expected to next meet in Beijing this spring, Vegas oddsmakers have their work cut out for them predicting whether Taiwan will be significantly addressed in future discussions, let alone what the two leaders might agree upon.

As interactions between D.C. and Beijing play out, Jerry would encourage us to get on the ground in Taiwan as well as in Japan and other countries in the Indo-Pacific. They also have the agency to shape the region’s future.

Seeing firsthand, for example, Taiwan’s multi-prong effort to build whole-of-society resilience—ranging from energy security to civilian defense—is critical to understanding how the people of Taiwan view the external threat they face. On the internal front, a fractious relationship between the executive and legislative branches, along with a currently nonoperative constitutional court, are obstacles to societal cohesion.

Or, go to Japan to learn how a new prime minister, who has indicated a supportive stance toward Taiwan and hawkish views on China, could shift regional dynamics. Or visit Australia to appreciate the dilemma of having China both as the largest trading partner and an increasing military presence in the surrounding waters.

Then do. Throughout his more than six-decade career engaging with Asia, Jerry applied information from his travels to initiatives spanning from deep-dive academic research to practical policy takeaways. In Jerry’s memory, let’s get to work.